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Griffin Ferry† 
Introduction  
War is often assumed to be a space devoid of a regulatory 
framing—characterized as inherently contrary to and separate 
from the input of social and ethical values expressed in laws—but 
international humanitarian law (IHL) contradicts this mistaken 
assumption.  A field as fluid as the conflicts it addresses, IHL has 
developed into a highly-regimented, value-driven framework that 
increasingly affects and constrains state behavior.1  Regulatory 
codifications of IHL are necessarily backwards-looking, arising in 
response to technological, political, and social developments that 
continuously change the nature of armed conflict.2  Despite this 
continual evolution, the oppression of women has been 
thematically constant over sixteen centuries of IHL evolution, an 
unfortunately consistent value that has far-reaching impacts for 
the field.3 
 
 †. Griffin Ferry is a legal fellow in the International Humanitarian Law 
Department of the American Red Cross.  Griffin would like to thank Fionnuala Ní 
Aoláin, Jennie Green, and Anne Dutton who contributed to the completion of this 
Article.  All views expressed in this article are his alone and do not necessarily 
represent or reflect the views of the American Red Cross. 
 1. See David Wippman, The Nine Lives of Article 2(4), 16 MINN. J. INT’L. L. 
387, 390 (2007) (“[T]he notion that Article 2(4) [of the UN Charter, which prohibits 
nations from using force without Security Council authorization] died . . . suggests 
a linear view of the effect of violations.  Under this view, the norm ultimately 
collapses under the accumulated weight of too many and too significant breaches.  
This approach assumes that legal norms operate on a one-way ratchet, in which 
violations progressively undermine a norm with no room for recovery in between 
violations.  In fact, Article 2(4) has displayed remarkable resilience; it not only 
stubbornly refuses to die, but sometimes emerges stronger than before.”).  But see 
Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? or: Changing Norms Governing the Use 
of Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 809, 809 (1970) (asserting that Article 2(4) 
failed primarily because state practice showed the frequency of breach surpassed 
that of adherence). 
 2. See Jean d’Aspremont, Decolonization and the International Law of 
Succession: Between Regime Exhaustion and Paradigmatic Inconclusiveness, 12 
CHINESE J. INT’L. L. 321, 322 (2013). 
 3. See Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, The Gender of Jus Cogens, 
15 HUM. RTS. Q. 63, 71 (1993) (arguing that the continued oppression, 
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The foundational doctrines of IHL evidence the 
marginalization of women in various ways.  Notably, the doctrines 
repeatedly use essentialized conceptualizations of women as weak, 
infantile persons requiring protection from physical violence above 
all else to justify oppressive codifications.  Ostensibly progressive 
IHL codifications rest on theoretical underpinnings that 
modernize historic inequality and perpetuate IHL’s androcentric 
condition. 
This Article unearths and analyzes the patriarchal roots of 
IHL and its essentialized conceptualizations of women with a 
gender-focused examination of the Summa Theologica, the Lieber 
Code, the Hague Conventions, and the Geneva Conventions.  
These foundational IHL texts contain recurring themes that 
marginalize, sexualize, and infantilize women under the guise of 
protection.  The texts are fora in which the objectification and 
marginalization of women in conflict are surreptitiously endorsed 
and legitimized.  Understanding the history and forms of female 
oppression is a critical first step toward ensuring the future of IHL 
does not perpetuate the shortcomings of the past. 
I. Just War Theory 
The seeds of IHL were sown in the late fourth and early fifth 
centuries by the theological doctrine of justum bellum.4  Developed 
by Augustine of Hippo, justum bellum was an explanation of how 
and why armed conflicts should be fought, one of the earliest 
iterations of what would come to be known as just war theory.5  In 
the thirteenth century, this body of thought became the doctrinal 
basis underpinning Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologica.6  This 
landmark text divided justum bellum into jus ad bellum (“right to 
war”7) and jus in bello (“law in waging war”8).9  Together, jus ad 
 
discrimination, and sexual violence perpetrated against women in conflict is a 
worldwide phenomenon and constitutes a “rare area [of international law] where 
there is genuinely consistent and uniform state practice”). 
 4. See Robert D. Sloane, The Costs of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of 
Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT’L 
L. 47, 57 (2009) (naming Augustine as “the progenitor of theological just war 
doctrine”); James O’Donnell, Saint Augustine: Christian Bishop and Theologian, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (June 24, 2016), https://www.britannica.com/
biography/Saint-Augustine (reporting that Augustine of Hippo lived from 354 A.D. 
to 430 A.D.). 
 5. Sloane, supra note 4, at 57. 
 6. See id. at 58. 
 7. Jus Ad Bellum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 8. Jus in Bello, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 9. Compare THOMAS AQUINAS, 2 SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. II-II, question 40, 
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bellum and jus in bello constitute just war theory, the 
philosophical underpinning of modern IHL codifications that use 
the principles of proper authority, just cause, and rightful 
intention to define legitimate wars.10  This formulation of just war 
theory, which encompassed the patriarchal and theological values 
of the era, formed the basis for modern Western understandings of 
wartime morality, highlighting its continued importance.11 
As an abstract doctrine, Aquinas’s just war theory differs 
from its successor texts in that it does not contain an essentialized 
view of women in conflict.  Instead, the doctrine excludes women 
by its very structure, an absence that foreshadows later 
conceptualizations of women as objects, rather than actors, in war.  
Female absence is evident in each of the fundamental principles of 
just war theory.  First, Aquinas’s principle of proper authority 
restricts the ability to initiate armed conflict to sovereign states.12  
In Aquinas’s world, men alone controlled the state while women 
were passive subjects of the law.  By harnessing the right to 
initiate armed conflict to the men who held state power, the 
principle of proper authority reflected the prevailing roles of men 
as actors and women as objects.13 
The just war tradition is further masculinized by the second 
principle—just cause—which envisions self-defense of the state as 
 
art. 1, at 1359–60 (Benziger Brothers, Inc.  1947) (discussing the “authority of the 
sovereign” and “just cause,” both components of jus ad bellum)), with id. at 1360 
(explaining that “belligerents should have a rightful intention” and stating that 
“[m]anly exercises in warlike feats of arms are not all forbidden, but those which 
are inordinate and perilous, and end in slaying or plundering” are forbidden).  But 
see Sloane, supra note 4, at 58 (“Aquinas . . . did not develop a distinct jus in bello.  
Although he condemned the deliberate slaughter of noncombatants, this and other 
scattered theological antecedents did not add up to a coherent conception of jus in 
bello as a set of legal or ethical injunctions.”). 
 10. See Mark E. DeForrest, Just War Theory and the Recent U.S. Strikes 
Against Iraq, 1 GONZ. J. INT’L L. § B.1 (1997–98), https://www.law.gonzaga.edu/gjil/
2006/03/just-war-theory-and-the-recent-us-strikes-against-iraq/ (citing St. 
Augustine, who said that war can only be justified by a desire for peace and must 
be waged under lawful authority). 
 11. See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 21 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing 
the continued use of the concepts of jus ad bellum and jus in bello to assess the 
morality of war). 
 12. AQUINAS, supra note 9, at 1359 (“In order for a war to be just, three things 
are necessary.  First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is 
to be waged . . . .  [I]t is not the business of a private individual to declare war.”). 
 13. Cf. Judith Gardam, Gender and Non-Combatant Immunity, 3 TRANSNAT’L 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 345, 356 (1993) (arguing that the tenets of just war theory 
concerning non-combatants, while often “regarded as based on principles of 
humanity, in reality . . . serve[] the purposes of the patriarchal State” and are 
derived from “the canonical doctrine which primarily protected the Church’s own to 
the exclusion of women”). 
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the only moral justification for armed conflict.14  By predicating 
the validity of armed conflict on the defense of the patriarchal 
state, just cause marks wartime morality as a thoroughly 
masculine-defined space.  In this way, just cause, indirectly but 
unavoidably, focuses on the male perspective and precludes the 
consideration of female experiences, prioritizing the protection of 
masculine entities above all else. 
Unlike proper authority and just cause, which focus on jus ad 
bellum, Aquinas’ third principle—right intention—speaks to jus in 
bello.15  Right intention requires the state’s reason for initiating 
armed conflict to be pure and articulated in moral terms.16  
Aquinas’s definition of “morality” echoes the theology and values 
of the medieval Catholic Church.17  Right intention fills the moral 
void of the battlefield with the masculine values of Christian 
theology in a way which either “legitimates killing 
or . . . condemns violence without attending to the despair and 
abuse from which it arises.”18  This patriarchal institution joins 
the masculine state institutions shaping jus ad bellum to round 
out the thoroughly-gendered paradigm of just war theory.19 
 
 14. See AQUINAS, supra note 9, at 1360 (“Secondly, a just cause is required, 
namely that those who are attacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on 
account of some fault.”). 
 15. See id. (condemning as contrary to “rightful intention” “[t]he passion for 
inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, an unpacific and relentless spirit, 
the fever of revolt, the lust of power, and such like things”); cf. GARY D. SOLIS, THE 
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 7 (2010) 
(stating that actions in war are “limited to the means considered ‘necessary’” and 
that “indiscriminate violence suggests violence as an end in itself, and that is 
antithetical to the fact that war is a goal-oriented activity”). 
 16. AQUINAS, supra note 9, at 1360 (“Thirdly, it is necessary that the 
belligerents should have a rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement 
of good, or the avoidance of evil.  Hence Augustine says . . . ‘True religion looks 
upon as peaceful those wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement, or 
cruelty, but with the object of securing peace, of punishing evil-doers, and of 
uplifting the good . . . . The passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for 
vengeance, an unpacific and relentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of power, 
and such like things, all these are rightly condemned in war.’”). 
 17. See Sloane, supra note 4, at 58–59 (discussing the influence of Catholic 
theology on the creation of the just war doctrine). 
 18. SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF PEACE 135 
(1989); see also Sloane, supra note 4, at 58 (“In general, in the theological, as in the 
Roman, tradition, a just cause authorized any means of war, however brutal.”). 
 19. Cf. Jean Bethke Elshtain, Reflections on War and Political Discourse: 
Realism, Just War, and Feminism in a Nuclear Age, in JUST WAR THEORY  260, 
263–64 (Jean Bethke Elshtain ed., 1992) (tracking a Hobbesian feminist legal 
theory and arguing that, “[i]f women are to gain ‘first-class citizenship’ they, too, 
must have the right to fight”). 
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Just war theory positions masculinity and Christian morality 
to dominate the sphere of armed conflict.20  Unlike later 
codifications that specifically address women, just war theory is 
devoid of any references to either women or men.  When the 
principles are understood in the context of their inextricable 
connection to patriarchal social institutions—wherein the ability 
to be an actor in conflict was predicated on gaining access to 
exclusively male institutions—this facial gender neutrality 
evidences not equality, but the total omission of women’s 
experiences in conflict.  The just war tradition takes on the 
androcentric hue of the greater social machinery by defining itself 
with reference to exclusive institutions.  This indirect yet powerful 
manifestation of masculine privilege demonstrates a phenomenon 
that continues into the modern day in which oppression is made 
invisible by ostensibly gender-neutral values which appear, at first 
glance, to be legitimate and moral.  Not for the last time in the 
history of IHL, just war theory articulates a gendered dynamic 
wherein de jure equality results in the de facto privileging of men. 
Furthermore, just war theory’s implicit denial of female 
agency set the stage for later IHL doctrines.  Out of this 
philosophical cloud emerge doctrines that perceive women as 
needing to be protected above all else, a perspective that 
perpetuates oppression and marginalization in the guise of 
“protection.”  The privilege bestowed upon men by just war theory 
and the marginalization suffered by women have enduring results; 
these asymmetries are the roots of the current normative 
framework of IHL. 
II. The Lieber Code 
In the six centuries following the publication of Summa 
Theologica, the rule of law made significant headway on the 
battlefield.  By the late nineteenth century, philosophical 
principles and customary laws of armed conflict had coalesced into 
general rules refined by the establishment of various national 
battlefield codes.21  The Lieber Code was among the first and most 
influential of these domestic codifications.22  Drafted by Franz 
 
 20. See JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, WOMEN AND WAR 91 (1987) (explaining that 
one of the ways that the feminine imagination is limited is by precluding the search 
for pacifist resolutions). 
 21. SOLIS, supra note 15, at 7. 
 22. Theodor Meron, Francis Lieber’s Code and Principles of Humanity, 36 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 269, 278 (1998) (“Both the Code’s high quality and its 
timing, written when no other significant compilations of laws and customs of war 
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Lieber in 1863, the Code was approved by President Abraham 
Lincoln to regulate the conduct of Union forces during the U.S. 
Civil War.23 
As the first substantial codification of the customary laws of 
armed conflict, the Lieber Code served as a guide for subsequent 
domestic and international codifications, affording it significant 
influence in the development of IHL.24  Accordingly, the Lieber 
Code’s provisions on the protection of women in conflict set the 
stage for the next century of IHL’s conceptions of women.25  
Departing from just war theory’s gender silence, the Lieber Code—
an innovative document reflecting the era’s changing views on 
femininity—provided unprecedented protections to civilians, in 
general, and women, in particular.26  Notably, Articles 19, 37, and 
44 speak directly about women.27 
The welcome inclusion of women obscures the Lieber Code’s 
problematic focus on protecting female bodies.  The Lieber Code 
understands the feminine legal personality to exist exclusively in 
dialogue with women’s physical integrity, as women’s bodies were 
understood to be male property.28  At the time of the Lieber Code, 
rape was “associated with crimes of property rather than crimes 
against the person”29 and understood primarily as a violation of 
masculine honor rather than the woman’s body.30  Under this 
view, women did not have independent legal personality but 
derived protection from men who had full legal capacity.31  Article 
 
were available, can explain its tremendous impact on the codification of 
international humanitarian law.”). 
 23. See George D. Haimbaugh, Jr., Introduction to Panel II: Humanitarian 
Law: The Lincoln-Lieber Initiative, 13 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 245, 245–46 (1983). 
 24. Diane Marie Amann, Punish or Surveil, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 873, 879 (2007) (“Later codifications of U.S. military law, among them the 
Articles of War, applied during the two World Wars, built upon the foundation 
established by the Lieber Code.  That code likewise formed a cornerstone of 
international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Conventions of 1949.”). 
 25. See Meron, supra note 22, at 275. 
 26. Patricia Viseur Sellers, The Cultural Value of Sexual Violence, 93 AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L L. PROC. 312, 317 (1999) (“The Lieber Code illustrates states’ changing view 
of persons within civil society in general and women in particular, and the effects 
that wartime sexual violence has on citizens.”). 
 27. FRANCIS LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE 
UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD 8–9, 14, 16 (Washington, Government Printing Office 
1898). 
 28. David S. Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in International Humanitarian 
Law as a Norm of Jus Cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine, 15 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 
219, 236 n.59 (2005). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See id. 
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37 reflects this perspective by linking a woman’s right to be free 
from sexual violence to the need to protect the “sacredness of 
domestic relations,” saying nothing about the impact of rape on 
the woman herself.32 
Article 44 serves a more utilitarian function in prohibiting 
rape, providing that “[a]ll wanton violence committed against 
persons in the invaded country, all destruction of property not 
commanded by the authorized officer, all robbery, all pillage or 
sacking, even after taking a place by main force, all rape, 
wounding, maiming, or killing of such inhabitants, are 
prohibited . . . .”33  Article 44 states that a disobedient soldier 
committing rape may be executed on the spot.34  Rape is viewed as 
a threat to troop discipline and, by extension, to the larger 
patriarchal military that depends on an orderly chain of 
command.35  In this context women are protected primarily for the 
needs of men, an implicit prioritization of the integrity of the 
masculinized military machinery over the integrity of women.36  
Though Article 37 and Article 44 demonstrate different 
motivations for prohibiting rape—masculine honor and military 
discipline, respectively—both locate the primary harms of rape on 
a masculine entity rather than with the woman herself.  Moreover, 
while these prohibitions provided protection for the physical 
integrity of women, they ignored the need to address the social, 
economic, and political harms women faced as a consequence of 
military conflict.  This narrow scope implies that the only harm a 
woman may face in conflict that merits consideration is a violation 
of her physical integrity and only insofar as such harm impacts 
masculine entities. 
 
 32. LIEBER, supra note 27, at 14 (“The United States acknowledge and protect, 
in hostile countries occupied by them, religion and morality; strictly private 
property; the persons of the inhabitants, especially those of women; and the 
sacredness of domestic relations.”). 
 33. Id. at 16. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Crystal N. Feimster, Rape and Justice in the Civil War, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
25, 2013), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/rape-and-justice-in-the-
civil-war/ (“Together the articles conceived and defined rape in women-specific 
terms as a crime against property, as a crime of troop discipline, and as a crime 
against family honor.  Most significantly, the articles codified the precepts of 
modern war on the protection of women against rape that set the stage for a 
century of humanitarian and international law.”). 
 36. Cf. Mark Visger, Civilian Court-Martial Jurisdiction and United States v. 
Ali: A Re-examination of the Historical Practice, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1111, 1132 
(2014) (asserting that rape has “an acute impact on morale, discipline, [and] 
mission-accomplishment within the theater” of armed conflict). 
64 Law & Inequality [Vol. 35:57 
Article 19 of the Lieber Code addresses women outside the 
context of sexual violence by requiring that “[c]ommanders, 
whenever admissible, inform the enemy of their intention to 
bombard a place, so that the noncombatants, and especially the 
women and children, may be removed before the bombardment 
commences.”37  Though the protective intent of the Article seems 
benign, coupling women with children implicitly diminishes 
women’s roles as capable participants in conflict.  Similarly, 
categorically designating women as noncombatants perpetuates 
the gendered bifurcation between combatants and noncombatants: 
men are soldiers and women are civilians.38  As just war theory 
gendered the normative architecture of IHL, the Lieber Code 
gendered its participants. 
Moreover, while Articles 19, 37, and 44 mark a certain degree 
of progress toward acknowledging women in conflict, their impact 
was limited by the practical realities of 1860s American society.  
When the Code was promulgated in 1863, women were 
disenfranchised and enjoyed limited legal rights.39  These 
pervasive barriers to legal access were augmented by the socially 
and sexually conservative culture which exalted women’s 
“virtue.”40  This social pressure made it difficult for women to come 
forward and dramatically reduced the relevance of these 
codifications for the many women who experienced sexual violence 
during the Civil War.41  In total, the Union military tribunals 
prosecuted only around 250 cases involving rape, though possibly 
thousands were the victims of rape and reports of rape were 
widespread.42 
The Lieber Code’s early effort to prohibit rape in conflict 
illustrates the large chasm between a right existing in the law and 
the right being accessible through the hardships of gender 
inequality, an echo of the theoretical and pragmatic disconnect of 
just war theory.  The Lieber Code offered some limited protection 
for women under the law, but did so at the heavy price of 
 
 37. LIEBER, supra note 27, at 8–9. 
 38. See Gardam, supra note 13, at 348. 
 39. Sellers, supra note 26, at 317 (“The code’s language is important, 
notwithstanding that in 1863, when the Lieber Code was issued, U.S. society did 
not grant citizenship to Native Americans or slaves, and women of European 
descent who did hold citizenship exercised only limited property rights and were 
universally disenfranchised.”). 
 40. CRYSTAL N. FEIMSTER, SOUTHERN HORRORS: WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF 
RAPE AND LYNCHING 20 (2009). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 20–21. 
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endorsing the view of women as objects with no capacity to make 
meaningful contributions and with no independent right to 
protection from physical harm. 
III. The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions 
As the Industrial Revolution ushered in an era of progressive 
idealism, it inspired a peace movement with hopes that Europe 
would move away from the use of force to resolve international 
disputes.43  Out of these aspirations came the 1899 and 1907 
Hague Conventions, the first comprehensive codifications 
regulating warfare with a focus on humanitarian principles.44  The 
binding international character of these texts also marked the 
shift from rules of warfare to laws of warfare.45  As the 
Conventions recast previous IHL principles as binding 
obligations,46 however, they remained colored by patriarchal 
values, bringing the androcentric focus of Aquinas and Lieber into 
the modern law of armed conflict. 
Though the Hague Conventions incorporate much of the 
Lieber Code’s text, Lieber’s explicit references to sexual harms 
suffered by women in conflict are noticeably absent.47  The failure 
to codify clear prohibitions on sexual violence stems from Western 
discomfort with women’s sexuality during this era.48  The closest 
the Conventions come to addressing sexual violence is a 
euphemistic reference in Article 46.49  The Article provides that 
“[f]amily honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private 
property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be 
respected.”50  “Family honour and rights” is understood as a 
 
 43. SOLIS, supra note 15, at 51 (2010) (“In the nineteenth century, the 
European world, along with the United States, developed a confidence in modern 
progress that extended to a hope that the abolition of war was possible.”). 
 44. MARIA ERIKSSON, DEFINING RAPE: EMERGING OBLIGATIONS FOR STATES 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW? 345 (2011) (“The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions 
were the first to embody comprehensive normative principles regulating warfare on 
the basis of humanity.”). 
 45. See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 57–58. 
 46. Id. at 56. 
 47. TUBA INAL, LOOTING AND RAPE IN WARTIME: LAW AND CHANGE IN 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 63 (2013). 
 48. See id. at 65 (“One possibility is that the Europeans of the nineteenth 
century—with their emphasis on decency, finesse, manners, and propriety—did not 
want to spell out the word rape, particularly in a diplomatic document.  From the 
mid-eighteenth century onward, as a result the rise of the idea of delicacy, or 
prudery, sexuality in any form offended and embarrassed people . . . .”). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land annex art. 
46, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 227 [hereinafter Hague Convention IV]; Convention with 
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reference to sexual violence,51 but unlike other articles which 
declare actions “prohibited” or “forbidden,” Article 46 only 
demands “respect” of family honor.52 
By contrast, Article 23 “especially forbid[s]” eight different 
crimes.53  From a prohibition on the use of poisoned weapons to 
wounding of an enemy attempting to surrender, the enumerated 
crimes focus exclusively on harms that may befall active 
participants in conflict,54 a realm inaccessible to women in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  These “especially 
forbidden” crimes derive from the hyper-masculine chivalric 
tradition, the resurrection of which underlines the point that 
conflict remains an entirely masculine space.55  The hierarchy of 
harms created by Article 23 juxtaposed against the weak language 
found in Article 46 demonstrates the deprioritization of women’s 
experiences in conflict and greater subordination to hegemonic 
masculinity in IHL codifications.56  Moreover, given the clear 
difference between the strong prohibitions in Article 23 and the 
watered-down language of Article 46, Article 46 is problematic in 
at least four respects.  First, it casts rape as a moral offense akin 
 
Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land annex art. 46, July 29, 1899, 32 
Stat. 1803 [hereinafter Hague Convention II]. 
 51. Patricia Viseur Sellers, The Context of Sexual Violence: Sexual Violence as 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, in 1 SUBSTANTIVE AND 
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE EXPERIENCE OF 
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COURTS 263, 275 n.64 (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & 
Olivia Swaak-Goldman eds., 2000) (“That ‘family honor’ meant forms of sexual 
violence was only too apparent.  The Commission of Government Experts’ Study of 
Conventions for the Protection of War Victims . . . urged, in light of the rapes, 
indecent assaults and placement of women in disorderly houses, and the proscribed 
recognition of ‘family honor’ in Article 46 of . . . Hague Convention IV, that a more 
precise definition respecting the decency and dignity of women be proclaimed in the 
new Conventions.”). 
 52. For example, the very next article, Article 47, states clearly “[p]illage is 
formally forbidden.”  Hague Convention IV, supra note 50, at annex art. 7. 
 53. Hague Convention IV, supra note 50, annex art. 23; Hague Convention II, 
supra note 50, annex art. 23. 
 54. Hague Convention IV, supra note 50, annex art. 23. 
 55. See LÉON GAUTIER, CHIVALRY (London, George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 
Henry Frith trans. 1891) (discussing the chivalric code with respect to acts of 
treachery and surrender, the provision of quarter, and the formalities of a truce), 
published fifteen years before the Hague Convention II, supra note 50, art. 23 
(prohibiting treachery, the killing of a surrendered individual, the refusal of 
quarter, and the improper use of a flag of truce). 
 56. The overt masculinity of the Hague Conventions is also textually evident.  
All gendered pronouns are masculine, demonstrating that women’s presence on the 
battlefield was inconceivable at the time of the Conventions.  See, e.g., Hague 
Convention II, supra note 50, annex art. 9 (“Every prisoner of war, if questioned, is 
bound to declare his true name and rank, and if he disregards this rule, he is liable 
to a curtailment of the advantages accorded to the prisoners of war of his class.”). 
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to property offenses instead of a crime of violence, a demotion on 
the perceived hierarchy of harms occurring in conflict.57   Second, 
the framing of Article 46 directs focus to the victim and the 
victim’s family honor rather than the perpetrator’s violence, 
weakening accountability for both the perpetrator and the state.58  
Third, by identifying sexual violence as the primary harm that 
women will face in conflict, the Hague Conventions perpetuate the 
problematic idea that the harms faced by men and women in 
conflict are mutually exclusive, marginalizing men who experience 
sexual violence.59  Finally, the Conventions continue to imply that 
sexual violence against women only merits redress when it 
impacts men’s interests.  In an era where women continued to be 
considered property of men, Article 46 was designed “to facilitate 
pacification of the subjugated population during occupation,” i.e. 
prevent men from becoming upset at the rape of “their” women.60  
In both the goal and implementation, Article 46 exemplifies how 
women’s experiences are distinguished from those of men, yet 
women are recognized primarily for the effect they have on men. 
Though Article 46 is the most overt reference to sexual 
violence in the Conventions, many believe a prohibition on rape 
can also be read into Article 1.61  The text of Article 1 provides that 
“[t]he Contracting Powers shall issue instructions to their armed 
land forces which shall be in conformity with the Regulations 
respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land . . . .”62  While 
“the laws and customs of war” at the time of these Conventions did 
include a general prohibition on rape and sexual violence,63 their 
 
 57. In contrast, the language describing violent crimes such as using prohibited 
weapons or killing outside of a military campaign is much stronger and clearly 
demonstrates the priorities of the drafters of the Convention.  Compare Hague 
Convention IV, supra note 50, at sec. III, ch. III art. 46 (“Family honour and rights, 
the lives of person, and private property, as well as religious convictions and 
practices, must be respected.”), with id. at sec. II, ch. I, art. 23 (“[I]t is especially 
forbidden: (a.) To employ poison or poisoned weapons; (b.) To kill or wound 
treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army; (c.) To kill or 
wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of 
defence, has surrendered at discretion . . . .”) 
 58. See INAL, supra note 47, at 66 (arguing that the primary reason state 
parties to the Convention preferred vague language was that states did not wish to 
bind themselves with clearer, specific language prohibiting rape). 
 59. For example, while Article 46 or the customary laws of war in 1907 “could 
be interpreted to include prohibition of rape of prisoners of war . . . [that] 
interdiction was first explicitly incorporated into the Geneva Convention of 1929.”  
Sellers, supra note 51, at 275 n.65. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Hague Convention IV, supra note 50, at art. 1. 
 63. See Sellers, supra note 51, at 274 (stating that rape was among the crimes 
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lack of specificity provides scant protection for women and, like 
Article 46, are only applicable in wartime. 
Articles 1, 23, and 46 draw from and build upon the gendered 
foundation laid by just war theory and the Lieber Code.64  While 
purporting to protect humanity, the Hague Conventions mistake 
masculinity for humanity.65  The consideration of rape as a moral 
violation of honor, applicable only during occupation, reflects the 
prudery of the era and embeds the dissociation of femininity and 
armed conflict into modern IHL.66  Read together, the Lieber Code 
and the Hague Conventions evidence how a singular, essentialized 
view of women causes this dissociation: women are either 
mentioned in their sexual capacity,67 they are discussed in a 
diminished capacity on par with children,68 or they are mentioned 
only indirectly when their sexuality becomes uncomfortable.69  In 
all these scenarios, women are restricted by societal views that 
only conceive of a woman in a sexual or reproductive capacity or as 
a diminished actor who lacks agency.  The preceding doctrines of 
IHL make this oppression seem natural and ethical.70  This 
essentialized view of women gives rise to efforts to “protect” these 
sexual, weak objects and continues female marginalization into 
the modern era. 
IV. The 1949 Geneva Conventions 
Throughout history, developments in IHL have been 
prompted by developments in warfare that exposed gaps in 
existing IHL codifications.71  The 1949 Geneva Conventions arose 
in response to the widespread devastation and tactical targeting of 
civilians in World War II.72  The drafters of the 1949 treaties 
revised the three existing Geneva Conventions and introduced the 
fourth (Geneva IV), a groundbreaking treaty dedicated exclusively 
 
framers of the Hague Conventions intended to proscribe when they used the phrase 
“laws and customs of war”). 
 64. See INAL, supra note 47, at 63. 
 65. See Hague Convention II, supra note 50, Preamble (stating that the parties 
to the Convention were “[a]nimated by the desire to serve . . . the interests of 
humanity”). 
 66. See INAL, supra note 47, at 65; Sellers, supra note 51, at 275. 
 67. LIEBER, supra note 27, at 8–9 (Article 19), 14 (Article 37). 
 68. Id. at 16 (Article 44). 
 69. Hague Convention IV, supra note 50, at annex art. 46. 
 70. See discussion of Aquinas and just war theory, supra Section I. 
 71. Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 64 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 239, 243 (“Calamitous events and atrocities have repeatedly driven the 
development of international humanitarian law.”). 
 72. SOLIS, supra note 15, at 80. 
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to the protection of civilians in conflict.73  The 1949 Conventions 
are the most-ratified treaties in the world and comprise the bulk of 
present-day IHL.74  The changing roles of women in conflict and 
society are evidenced in thirty-four references to the unique 
experience of women in conflict, a welcome improvement from the 
silence of the Hague Conventions.75 
Unfortunately, the Conventions continue to bifurcate civilian 
and combatant statuses along gendered lines, define the value of 
women by reproductive capacity, and reflect old tropes of chastity 
and purity.  Article 88 of the Third Geneva Convention provides: 
Officers, non-commissioned officers and men who are 
prisoners of war undergoing a disciplinary or judicial 
punishment, shall not be subjected to more severe treatment 
than that applied in respect of the same punishment to 
members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power of 
equivalent rank. 
A woman prisoner of war shall not be awarded or sentenced to 
a punishment more severe, or treated whilst undergoing 
punishment more severely, than a woman member of the 
armed forces of the Detaining Power dealt with for a similar 
offence. 
In no cases may a woman prisoner of war be awarded or 
sentenced to a punishment more severe, or treated whilst 
undergoing punishment more severely, than a male member of 
the armed forces of the Detaining Power dealt with for a 
similar offense.76 
Article 88 is one of the few articles that addresses women 
beyond their role as mothers and thus foresees conflicts in which 
women, in defiance of traditional gender roles, are active 
 
 73. Id. at 83–84. 
 74. Philip Spoerri, Director of International Law, ICRC, Address at Ceremony 
to Celebrate the 60th Anniversary of the Geneva Conventions (Dec. 8, 2009) 
(transcript available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/
geneva-conventions-statement-120809.htm) (“With the last few (7) ratifications 
since the year 2000 the application of the Geneva Convention has today become 
universal, with 194 States party.”). 
 75. See e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949 arts. 3, 12, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of 
the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea arts. 3, 12, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 3, 14, 16, 25, 29, 49, 88, 97, 108, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War arts. 3, 
14, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 27, 38, 50, 76, 85, 91, 97, 98, 119, 124, 127, 132, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. 
 76. Geneva Convention III, supra note 75, at art. 88. 
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participants.77  While the express acknowledgement of women’s 
unique situation on the battlefield is welcome, instances of this 
acknowledgement are few and far between.78  Further, Article 88 
separates the experience of female combatants—singling them out 
as an exception to the rule of male combatants—and thus reveals 
that the gender-neutral language that predominates the rest of 
the Geneva Conventions speaks to men alone.79  Thus, while the 
inclusion of female combatants is a step toward viewing women 
outside the essentialized depictions of the Lieber Code and Hague 
Conventions, the paucity of these mentions and the gendered 
bifurcation of Article 88 elucidate the continued understanding of 
men as the sole capable actors in conflict.80 
Though Article 88 provides limited female recognition in the 
hegemonic construct of combatancy, other articles perpetuate the 
shortcomings of previous IHL texts that accord women legitimacy 
solely in the context of their reproductive capacity.81  Thus, many 
of the 1949 Conventions’ references to women focus on pregnancy 
and maternity.82  For example, Article 38 of Geneva III states that 
 
 77. See, e.g., Geneva Convention III, supra note 75, at annex I, sec. I(B)(7) (“All 
women prisoners of war who are pregnant or mothers with infants and small 
children”; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 75, at art. 14 (stating that parties to 
the Convention “may establish . . . hospital and safety zones and localities so 
organized as to protect from the effects of war” among other persons “expectant 
mothers and mothers of children under seven”). 
 78. For example, the fourth Geneva Convention has 159 articles and only 19 of 
them—Articles 3, 14, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 27, 38, 50, 76, 85, 91, 97, 98, 119, 124, 127, 
132—or about 12%, mention women or females.  Geneva Convention IV, supra note 
75. 
 79. See e.g. Geneva Convention III, supra note 75, at art. 4 (defining 
“[p]risoners of war” as “persons belonging to one of the following categories, who 
have fallen into the power of the enemy: . .”). 
 80. See BETHKE ELSHTAIN, supra note 20, at 40–42 (1987) (contending that 
dualistic gender discourse which casts men as warriors and women as “beautiful 
souls” who embody domesticity fails to reflect the reality and complexity of both 
women’s and men’s shifting roles in both peacetime and wartime). 
 81. Helen Durham & Katie O’Byrne, The Dialogue of Difference: Gender 
Perspectives on International Humanitarian Law, 92 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 
31, 34 (2010) (explaining that IHL “often either relegates women to the status of 
victims, or accords them legitimacy only in their role as child-rearers”). 
 82. E.g. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 75, art. 16 (“The wounded and sick, 
as well as the infirm, and expectant mothers, shall be the object of particular 
protection and respect.”); id. at art. 38 (“Children under fifteen years, pregnant 
women and mothers of children under seven years shall benefit by any preferential 
treatment to the same extent as the nationals of the State concerned.”); id. at art. 
50 (“The Occupying Power shall not hinder the application of any preferential 
measures in regard to food, medical care and protection against the effects of war 
which may have been adopted prior to the occupation in favour of children under 
fifteen years, expectant mothers, and mothers of children under seven years.”); id. 
at art. 89 (“Expectant and nursing mothers and children under fifteen years of age 
shall be given additional food, in proportion to their physiological needs.”); id. at 
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“[c]hildren under fifteen years, pregnant women and mothers of 
children under seven years shall benefit by any preferential 
treatment to the same extent as the nationals of the State 
concerned.”83  As in the Lieber Code, the 1949 Conventions refer to 
women and children in the same manner,84 infantilizing women as 
passive and incapable persons.  This presentation also denies the 
existence of men as civilians, furthering the artificially-gendered 
and—post-World War II—increasingly anachronistic dichotomy 
between civilians and combatants.85  The Geneva Conventions 
acknowledge women’s specific needs as mothers nearly to the 
exclusion of any acknowledgement of their needs qua women.  In 
favoring women’s reproductive lives over their independent 
identities, the Geneva Conventions reduce women to a singular 
identity and ignore the non-reproductive harms suffered by 
women.86 
Further linking women’s value with their bodies, Article 27 of 
Geneva IV provides that, “[w]omen shall be especially protected 
against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, 
enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.”87  Article 
27 revisits the “honor” crimes that originated in the Lieber Code 
and continued in the Hague Conventions, nesting sexual violence 
in terms intrinsically related to notions of chastity and purity and 
continuing to focus on female victimization via crimes of rape.88  
As in the Hague Conventions, Article 27 does not envision rape as 
 
art. 132 (“The Parties to the conflict shall, moreover, endeavour during the course 
of hostilities, to conclude agreements for the release, the repatriation, the return to 
places of residence or the accommodation in a neutral country of certain classes of 
internees, in particular children, pregnant women and mothers with infants and 
young children, wounded and sick, and internees who have been detained for a long 
time.”). 
 83. Geneva Convention III, supra note 75, at art. 38. 
 84. Compare Geneva Convention IV, supra note 75, at art. 38 (“Children under 
fifteen years, pregnant women and mothers of children under seven years shall 
benefit by any preferential treatment to the same extent as the nationals of the 
State concerned.”), with LIEBER, supra note 27, at 8–9 (requiring, in Article 19, that 
“[c]ommanders, whenever admissible, inform the enemy of their intention to 
bombard a place, so that the noncombatants, and especially the women and 
children, may be removed before the bombardment commences”). 
 85. See Françoise Krill, The Protection of Women in International 
Humanitarian Law, 249 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 337 (1985) (noting that “[i]n World 
War II, women participated in hostilities in greater numbers”). 
 86. See Durham & O’Byrne, supra note 81, at 34. 
 87. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 75, art. 27. 
 88. Compare id. (“Women shall be especially protected against any attack on 
their honour . . . .”), with LIEBER, supra note 27 (“The United States acknowledge 
and protect . . . the persons of the inhabitants, especially those of women . . . .”), 
and Hague Convention IV (“Family honour and rights . . . must be respected.”). 
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a violation on par with other crimes prohibited in Geneva IV that 
conceive of violations against personhood.89  The language of 
“honor” again casts rape as a moral, rather than criminal, 
offense.90  Recognizing rape primarily as a violation of women’s 
value as “pure” sexual beings—rather than as a violation of her 
personhood—presents a skewed view of the world in which men 
are not raped and the worst harm a woman can suffer is a 
violation of her sexual purity.91 
The Geneva Conventions display the compromised equality of 
the modern era.  Provisions addressed specifically to women 
demonstrate that the conspicuously gender-neutral language 
elsewhere is in fact masculine.92  These provisions grant 
protections to women on the premise of their inherently-greater 
vulnerability and are accompanied by provisions addressing only 
women’s sexual and reproductive lives.93  This knee-jerk 
protectionism presents two problematic echoes of earlier IHL 
texts. First, the focus on maternal or sexual harms marginalizes 
the roles women play outside of those capacities.94  Second, the 
harms addressed in the Geneva Conventions are rooted in 
masculine dominion over the female body.95  Women are protected 
because they bear children96 and women are protected from 
“honour crimes,”97 a return to the era where the female body 
belonged to men.  The Geneva Conventions perpetuate a model 
that fails to see women as persons independently worth 
protecting.98  In this way, seemingly protective measures serve to 
extend archaic and limited understandings of women and their 
bodies into the modern era under the auspices of protection and 
equality.99  In the world of the Geneva Conventions, men fight to 
protect innocent and vulnerable women whose legal capacity 
 
 89. See Durham & O’Byrne, supra note 81, at 35. 
 90. See supra text accompanying note 57. 
 91. See supra text accompanying note 59; FEIMSTER, supra note 40, at 19–20. 
 92. See supra text accompanying notes 78–85. 
 93. See supra text accompanying note 86. 
 94. Compare Geneva Convention IV, supra note 75, at art. 38 (requiring 
“preferential treatment” for “pregnant women and mothers of children under seven 
years”), with Hague Convention IV, supra note 50 (“Family honour and 
rights . . . must be respected.”) 
 95. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 75, at art. 27 (focusing on protecting 
women’s honor); see also supra text accompanying notes 39–41 (discussing the 
primacy of women’s virtue in the mid-19th century). 
 96. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 75, at art. 38. 
 97. Id. at art. 27. 
 98. See Durham & O’Byrne, supra note 81, 34–35. 
 99. See id. 
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continues to be predicated on a masculine conduit.100  From this 
perspective, the subordination of women in IHL doesn’t appear to 
be incidental, but deliberately constructed. 
Conclusion 
One must look no further than the Women, Peace and 
Security Agenda (WPSA) to see that, despite normative changes in 
IHL, the phenomenon of oppression though protection has 
continued into the present day.  The WPSA was launched in 2000 
and consists of seven interrelated Security Council resolutions 
that provide the most recent manifestation of “protection” which 
fails to meaningfully recognize the experiences of women in 
conflict and post-conflict settings.101  The protection of women from 
conflict-related sexual violence is mentioned in each resolution 
comprising the WPSA.102  Feminist scholars were quick to critique 
this essentialist focus, noting it depicts a woman’s body as the only 
possible feminine site of violence while overlooking the plethora of 
other harms women may face in conflict.103  This narrow focus on 
women’s bodies as the primary site needing “protection” reduces 
women to a singular conflict experience and allows the WPSA to 
be more easily manipulated to legitimize androcentric conflicts.104  
Accordingly, in much the same way as the Geneva Conventions 
before it, the WPSA facilitates the objectification of women 
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without providing substantive protections for the myriad non-
sexual harms arising in modern conflict.105 
The danger of high-visibility mandates, like the WPSA, that 
fail to address root causes of inequality is the creation of a veneer 
of equality that placates the international community and 
decreases motivation to address the true problems.  Analyses of 
the complex relationship between IHL and the social values 
underlying its codifications are noticeably absent from gender 
critiques of the WPSA, as well as critiques of the broader corpus of 
IHL.  The marginalization of women in conflict is but a symptom 
of greater and longstanding social and cultural inequalities that 
IHL will not be able to overcome without a deep and critical 
awareness of its own history. 
The foundational texts of IHL document a long history of 
female oppression.  From just war theory’s denial of women’s 
capabilities in conflict emerges the compromised equality of the 
present day, wherein women are present in IHL texts but 
primarily as victims of sexual harm or infantilized persons 
needing protection above all else.  Women’s experiences in conflict 
have been deprioritized for centuries, generally only considered to 
the extent they impact male interest.  To genuinely and 
holistically empower women in traditional and non-traditional 
conflict settings by way of international codifications, we must 
first make salient the normative roots of current equality.  It is 
long past time for the development of a normative framework that 
is able to acknowledge the deep roots of gendered oppression in 
IHL and work to meaningfully repair the errors of the past. 
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